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INTRODUCTION 
"This fascinating volume offers arguments that are both 
significant and surprising ... a major work from a leading writer, 
it will force many to re-think why and how law matters" (p. viii). 
The editors of the Oxford Legal Philosophy book series, just 
quoted, got it right. Harel's book is a constitutional and 
philosophical treat. It is innovative and thought-provoking (much 
like Harel's previous work on related issues). It forces the reader 
to re-think major and common assumptions about the law and 
especially about constitutional procedures and institutions. The 
fact that I disagree with many of Harel's arguments-and with his 
main thesis- is marginal to the pleasure of reading the book and 
to the great challenge that it poses to those who do not share its 
main argument. This argument, in short, is that various legal and 
political institutions and procedures (constitutions and judicial 
review, for example) are desirable as such, i.e. regardless of their 
ability to facilitate the realization of valuable ends and of their 
prospects to realize such ends. 
Interestingly, that was not Harel's original position, which 
was the exact opposite of the view presented in the book. 
According to Harel's original position, the desirability of 
constitutional directives hinges on the question of whether such 
directives are likely to guide the state or individual agents to act 
as they ought to. Accordingly, the desirability of judicial review 
and its optimal scope hinges exclusively on the question of 
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whether judicial review is conductive to reaching the right 
decision or acting in accordance with reason. 
Had Hare] chosen to write a book that established these 
arguments, this review would have been much shorter and less 
skeptical. However, Harel changed his views and now the book 
examines various legal and political institutions and procedures 
and argues that the desirability of these institutions and 
procedures is not contingent and does not hinge on the 
prospects that these institutions are conductive to the 
realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions 
and legal procedures that arc often perceived as a contingent 
means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter as 
such (p. 2). 
I will start by raising doubts as to whether Harel does make 
a case for anti-instrumentalism with regard to some constitutional 
procedures and institutions. I will then question Harel's non-
instrumentalist approach with regard to constitutionalism and 
judicial review and will conclude with a short defense of modest 
constitutional instrumentalism. I will not discuss Harel's 
application of his general non-instrumentalist approach to the 
specific issues of "rights" and "privatization." 
1. DOES HAREL MAKE A CASE FOR NON-
INSTRUMENTALIST CONSTITUTIONJ\LISM? 
In the introduction to the book, Harel makes it clear that he 
does not argue that instrumental justifications necessarily fail and 
that he does not make a general argument against applying 
instrumental justifications in legal or political theory. He does 
argue that instrumental justifications that rest exclusively on 
contingencies are not free of difficulties. He also argues that with 
regard to the examples presented in the book, non-instrumental 
justifications are sound (p. 5). His more specific arguments later 
on imply that with regard to the examples presented in the book, 
non-instrumental justifications are not merely sound, but also 
supenor. 
At this point, we face a preliminary, conceptual difficulty. 
Throughout the book, Harel establishes his argument that 
constitutional institutions and procedures are important as such 
and that they have intrinsic value, in the sense that their 
desirability is not contingent and does not hinge on the prospects 
that these institutions are conductive to the realization of valuable 
ends. It is not always clear, however, to which of the possible 
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meanings of "intrinsic value" Harel refers-and whether all these 
meanings accurately explain what having "intrinsic value" 
actually means. We can find in the book at least four possible 
meanings of being "valuable as such" or for having "intrinsic 
value." 
Intrinsic value type 1 can be expressed as: "X is always good 
regardless of the consequences." For example, "autonomous 
decisions are always valuable regardless of the content of such 
decisions." This is probably the strongest, "purest" claim for 
something being valuable "as such." Some may claim that this is 
the only possible meaning of being "valuable as such." 
Intrinsic value type 2 can be expressed as: "X always brings 
about better consequences than the alternatives." For example, 
"autonomous decisions are always superior in terms of their 
content to non-autonomous decisions." This is a mixed argument 
with both instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist foundations 
(with the former being more dominant). 
Intrinsic value type 3 could be described as: "X is always 
preferable, other things being equal." For example, "good 
decisions have added value if they are autonomous- and bad 
autonomous decisions have more value than bad non-
autonomous decisions." This is a mild claim for something being 
valuable as such. 
Intrinsic value type 4 is: "X is a necessary (yet not sufficient) 
prerequisite for doing good." For example, "being autonomous is 
a necessary (yet not sufficient) prerequisite for making good 
decisions." This argument (much like type 2) also has 
instrumentalist foundations as our concern here is the 
consequences of X (being autonomous), which is making the right 
decisions. In that respect, X is merely a means to an end, at least 
in part. 
It is evident that different types of meaning of ''intrinsic 
value" or "being valuable as such" require different justifications 
or supporting arguments. Also, some types require more evidence 
or more powerful arguments in order to be convincing with regard 
to a particular X. In any event, it is clear that one can argue that 
X is valuable "as such" in many different ways. While reading 
Harel's arguments for different constitutional procedures and 
arguments being valuable "as such," one can admire their clarity 
and novelty. Concerns, however, may be raised with regard to 
their consistency. More accurately, I suspect that throughout the 
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book Harel argues for different types of meaning being "valuable 
as such" without explicitly differentiating between these types. 
For example, Harel argues that the desirability of various 
legal and political institutions and procedures "is not contingent 
and does not hinge on the prospects that these institutions are 
conductive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various 
legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as 
a contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends 
matter as such" (p. 2). This is clearly an "intrinsic value" argument 
of type 1 ("X is always good regardless of the consequences"). 
However, Harel also argues that the book "sides with those who 
believe that sometimes the justness or correctness of a decision 
depends on the institution making the decision and/or on the 
procedure by which the decision came about" (p. 2); that "legal 
institutions and procedures are often not mere contingent 
instruments to realize valuable ends; they are often necessary 
components of a just society" (p. 3); and, more specifically, that 
"constitutional entrenchment of rights is therefore a necessary 
precondition for freedom rather than merely a contingent 
instrument for protecting freedom" (p. 7). These are intrinsic 
value statements of type 4 ("X is a necessary yet not sufficient 
prerequisite for doing good"). 
Harel also suggests that "constitutions as well as judicial 
review are not mere instruments to guarantee good, just or 
coherent decisions; they are valuable for other reasons and their 
value does not depend only or primarily on the degree to which 
they contribute to the substantive merit of the resulting legislation 
or executive decision" (p. 133). Here Harel acknowledges that 
constitutions as well as judicial review are valuable also because 
and in so far as they guarantee good and just decisions. This is a 
modest argument according to which constitutions and judicial 
review are valuable both "as such" and as long as they contribute 
to the substantive merit of the resulting legislation or executive 
decision. It is quite clear that here Harel does not argue that 
constitutions and judicial review are always valuable regardless of 
the consequences (intrinsic value argument type 1) or that they 
are a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for doing good 
(intrinsic value type 4). It is not clear, however, whether Harel 
argues that constitutions and judicial review will always bring 
about better consequences than the alternative (no constitution 
or judicial review), which would in fact be an intrinsic value 
argument of type 2; or whether he argues that constitutions and 
judicial review are always preferable "other things being equal" 
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(i.e., it is better to have them even when we get the same results 
without having them), which would be intrinsic value argument 
type 3. 
Another concern regarding Harel's commitment to non-
instrumentalism arises from the following. Harel departs from 
those who argue that first we need to identify the "right" or 
correct decision- and then to identify the institution or procedure 
that is most likely to get it right. Instead, Harel argues that 
"sometimes the justness or correctness of a decision depends on 
the institution making the decision and/or on the procedure by 
which the decision came about" (p. 2). He also argues that "there 
is a close (or strong) affinity between legal and political 
institutions and procedures on the one hand and the desirable 
goals or values, such that the latter can, even in principle, be 
realised only by establishing the former" (p. 5). This is, again, an 
argument of intrinsic value type 4 (X is a necessary yet not 
sufficient prerequisite for doing good). As such it has strong 
instrumentalist foundations. Harel argues that sometimes (only?) 
certain institutions or procedures are likely to get certain 
decisions right and therefore these institutions are the ones that 
should make these decisions. In other words, even according to 
Harel, legal institutions and legal procedures are not in fact 
valuable as such. They are only valuable because with regard to 
certain decisions they are likely (or more likely?) to get it right. If 
Harel thinks that certain institutions and procedures will always 
get it right or if he thinks that it is inevitable that they would get 
it right-we are getting slightly closer to a stronger, yet not pure, 
"valuable as such" argument. If Harel thinks that certain 
institutions and procedures are preferable and valuable as such-
regardless of their being able to get it right or of their being a 
necessary condition for getting it right-then we would have a 
truly pure and powerful non-instrumentalist argument. But if 
certain institutions and procedures are formed in order to 
increase the likelihood that they would get it right-or are formed 
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for getting it right-
then these institutions and procedures are not valuable as such. 
They are only valuable if they are being used as instruments for 
getting it right. 
Up to now I have raised a few concerns about the true nature 
of Harel's general non-instrumentalist approach (within the 
context of constitutional theory). I will now move to discuss in 
more detail Harel's critique of constitutional instrumentalism 
within the context of constitutionalism and judicial review. 
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2. WHY CONSTITUTIONS MATTER 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS- AND THE 
DUTY TO PROTECT RIGHTS 
The title of part III of Harel's book is "Why Constitutions 
Matter: The Case for Robust Constitutionalism." Here Harel 
makes a few bold and fascinating arguments. His tnain argument 
is that "the constitutional entrenchment of pre-existing moral or 
political rights is valuable, independently of whether such an 
entrenchment is conductive to the protection of these rights" (p. 
7), and that 
the value of binding constitutionalism is grounded not in its 
likely contingent effect or consequences, e.g., better protection 
of rights; hut rather in the fact that constitutional entrenchment 
of rights constitutes public recognition that the protection of 
rights is the state's duty rather than a mere discretionary 
gesture on its part (pp. 7, 134). 
To clarify this point Harel adds that "in the absence of 
binding constitutional directives, a state which protects a right can 
be analogized to a debtor who gives what he owes to his lender 
but insists that his act is a charitable donation rather than a 
repayment of a debt" (pp. 7, 172-173). 
Harel suggests a rigid dichotomy: rights are protected either 
by duty-based decisions or by discretionary decisions (pp. 133, 
150). Moreover, Harel differentiates between moral or political 
duties on the one hand and constitutional duties on the other. 
Duty-based decisions, according to Harel, result from (and 
perhaps only from) entrenching rights in a constitution. Harel 
writes that "in the absence of constitutional entrenchment, 
conformity of the legislature with its moral/political duties is not 
sufficient as it does not represent sufficient recognition or 
acknowledgement of the state's duties. The effective protection of 
the duties in such a case can naturally be attributed to the 
legislature's judgments or inclinations and not necessarily to its 
duties" (p. 172). 
I suspect that Harel is a bit too quick in suggesting the 
dichotomy between protecting rights by duty-based decisions 
(which must be based on constitutionally entrenched rights) and 
protecting rights by discretionary decisions. He also accords too 
much weight to the distinction between moral or political duties 
and constitutional duties (by arguing that only the latter represent 
sufficient recognition or acknowledgement of the state's duties). 
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Lastly, a third type of duties-legal duties-which are not 
constitutional duties in the sense that they are not entrenched in 
a constitution, is ignored to some extent. 
What are the implications of differentiating between moral 
duties, legal duties and constitutional duties, and how does this 
differentiation relate to the distinction between duty-based 
decisions and discretionary decisions? Constitutional 
entrenchment of rights always creates a legal duty (but not 
necessarily moral duty) to protect these rights. Yet, the absence 
of constitutional entrenchment of rights does not rule out the 
state's acknowledgment of a moral and/or legal duty to protect 
these rights. The state-through its agents-has to protect rights 
as long as the state's laws compel its agents to do so. The state will 
protect rights if the state acknowledges a moral duty to do so. The 
moral duty to protect rights is independent of such rights 
incorporated into any legal norm, be that an ordinary statute or a 
constitution. Moreover, moral duties, when they are publicly 
acknowledged and deeply rooted in the society's traditions, 
conventions, customs and practices, does represent sufficient 
recognition or acknowledgement of the state's duties. The 
effective protection of the duties in such a case cannot be 
attributed to the legislature's mere judgments or inclinations, but 
rather to its publicly and politically binding moral duties. Thus, 
acts of grace or charity are not the only alternatives to 
constitutional entrenchment of rights, and constitutional 
entrenchment of rights is not the only source of duty for 
protecting such rights (both objectively- and from the point of 
view of the state itself). 
Harel may argue that the state (or the legislature) 
acknowledges its duty to protect rights only when these rights are 
constitutionally entrenched, i.e., only when these rights are 
incorporated into an entrenched constitution rather than included 
in an "ordinary" statute-or that the sense of duty is stronger in 
the former. Neither argument is convincing. It is true that the 
legislature can easily change its ordinary statutes whereas an 
entrenched constitution is harder to amend. But the state's organs 
are legally subject to the state's ordinary statutes and constitution 
alike- until they are changed. The fact that changing the 
constitution is more difficult than changing ordinary statutes is of 
little importance here. 
Harel does agree that there are moral rights, human rights or 
natural rights which are independent of judgments or preferences 
of the legislature or "the people." These rights, Harel argues, 
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should be constitutionally entrenched because they create "public 
recognition that the protection of rights is the state's duty rather 
than a mere discretionary gesture on its part" (p. 7). Here we 
could ask why this sense of duty is valuable as such- and whether 
it is valuable at all. Harel explicitly argues that the value in 
constitutional entrenchment of rights does not result from its 
being the best way to properly protect rights. Rather, it results 
from the recognition of the duty it imposes on the state to protect 
rights. In order to eliminate the "actual protection of rights" 
factor let us assume (as Harel also does) two states that equally 
protect human rights. State A protects human rights reluctantly 
and grudgingly-and only because its agents acknowledge that 
they are under a legal-constitutional duty to protect rights. The 
state's agents protect rights only or mostly because they fear that 
if they do not their decisions will be overturned by courts 
exercising judicial review or be condemned by others, either other 
states' agents or the public. State B protects human rights even 
though these rights are not constitutionally entrenched. It does so 
because it acknowledges its moral duty to protect rights. Is state 
A more virtuous than state B? Is there inherent value in acting in 
a certain way only because one is under a legal duty to do so? 
From the point of view of rights-holders, would they prefer their 
rights to be protected by state agents who only protect rights 
because they are under a legal-constitutional duty to do so, or 
would they prefer their rights to be protected by state agents who 
protect rights because they acknowledge that they are under a 
moral duty to do so? (Here, again, we have to assume that both 
states protect rights to the same extent). 
When a person's rights are protected only because others are 
under a legal duty to do so, that person is being tolerated rather 
than respected as an equal or as a rights-holder. \Vhen there are 
compelling moral reasons to acknowledge a person's moral right, 
protecting that right merely because the law compels one to do so 
may even insult the right-holder, making him feel tolerated rather 
than truly respected or accepted. A person is truly respected and 
accepted as an equal and as a rights-holder when his rights are 
respected, regardless of a legal duty to do so. 
It can be argued, of course, that we should not trust state 
agents to properly protect rights in the absence of a legal-
constitutional duty to do so-and that legal duties complement 
moral duties to protect rights and hence are necessary for a better 
protection of rights. This may be true but this is not what Harel is 
arguing. Harel argues that the value of binding constitutionalism 
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is grounded not in its likely contingent effect or consequences, 
such as a better protection of rights. Rather, it is grounded in the 
fact that constitutional entrenchment of rights constitutes public 
recognition that the protection of rights is the state's duty rather 
than a mere discretionary gesture on its part. My response thus 
far was that (a) protection of rights can be the state's legal and 
moral duty in the absence of "binding constitutionalism," or, in 
other words, protecting rights by exercising discretion is not the 
only alternative to binding constitutionalism; and (b) there is no 
inherent value in protecting rights merely out of a legal-
constitutional duty. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS-AND 
BEING AT THE MERCY OF THE RULER 
Harel insists that a state in which the legislature protects 
rights because it is bound by constitutional duties is superior to a 
state in which the legislature protects rights to the same extent but 
in the absence of such duties. This is so, Hare) argues, because in 
the latter case individuals live at the mercy of the legislature-i.e., 
their rights depend on the legislature's inclination (p. 148). Here 
Harel does not explicitly argue that living at the mercy of the 
legislature may result in uncertainty, a less stable protection of 
rights or a lesser protection of rights-as this will be an 
instrumentalist argument of the kind that Harel rejects. But he 
does write that the entrenchment of constitutional duties is 
essential to the protection of freedom. Citizens are freer in a 
society in which such rights are recognized as duties rather than 
resulting from the mere judgments or inclinations of legislatures. 
This is because in such a society citizens do not live at the mercy 
of their legislature and are not subject to its judgments or 
preferences (p. 149). Harel adds that citizens in a state in which 
rights are not constitutionally entrenched are subject "to the risk 
of a potential shift in the legislature's judgments or inclinations" 
(p. 151), and that they are subject to the arbitrary sway and 
potentially capricious will of the legislature. 
If the importance and value of the entrenchment of 
constitutional rights do not only lie in its being a form of 
"symbolic" public recognition that the protection of rights is the 
state's duty (and that may be a non-instrumentalist argument)-
but also on its being a means to an end (making the citizens freer 
and enhancing certainty and stability in terms of the extent to 
which rights are protected), then Harel is actually suggesting a 
very convincing yet instrumentalist argument for 
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constitutionalism. Harel answers this difficulty by endorsing a 
"republican understanding of freedom," according to which to be 
free does not only mean not being coerced, but also not living "at 
the mercy of the potential violator's inclinations" (p. 171). 
Moreover, he argues that "even if the citizens' rights are not 
better (or at least are equally) protected by constitutionally 
entrenching moral or political norms, citizens are freer under such 
a scheme as they are not subject to the judgments or inclinations 
of the legislature" (p. 172). This is a more subtle argument but is 
still not completely non-instrumentalist. Firstly, not being at the 
mercy of a potential violator's inclination and not being subject to 
the judgments or inclinations of the legislature is only valuable 
when the legislature or the executive are likely to violate rights. 
Put differently, not being at the mercy of the ruler is not valuable 
"as such" but as a means to an end-as a means to secure a proper 
protection of rights from unexpected, arbitrary or unjust 
violation. It is a defense mechanism against making things worse 
and it is only valuable when it actually prevents things from 
getting worse or is likely to do so. Therefore, Harel may be right 
by arguing that even if the citizens' rights are not better (or at least 
are equally) protected by constitutionally entrenching moral or 
political norms, entrenching rights is preferable. This is an "all 
other things being equal" argument (intrinsic value type 3), and, 
as such, it is convincing. But it would be odd to argue, in a purely 
non-instrumentalist way, that entrenching rights is always 
preferable (as it makes citizens freer) -even if it results in a lesser 
protection of rights or cannot prevent lesser protection of rights 
in a certain state at a certain time. 
Secondly, and as I noted earlier, the state's organs are legally 
subject to the state's ordinary statutes and constitution alike-
until either of the latter is changed. Constitutions, much like 
ordinary statutes, can be changed-and are changed. In that 
respect, citizens are still at the mercy of those who are authorized 
to change the constitution and are subject to their judgments and 
inclinations. Harel stresses that freedom, properly understood, is 
in fact "non-domination" (p. 174), and that "·domination is 
understood in terms of the potential for arbitrary interference" 
(p. 174). As constitutions, much like ordinary laws, can be 
changed on an arbitrary basis and can be interpreted arbitrarily, 
citizens are still at the mercy of the ruler. Some constitutions are 
indeed harder to change than "ordinary" statutes, but this is a 
matter of degree, not of principle. It seems that throughout his 
discussion Harel assumes that a constitution is an "external" 
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constraint, as if a third party creates it and constrains the state or 
the legislature by it, whereas the constitution can be created and 
often is amended, by the same "rulers" who are both subject to it 
and compel it on "the people." Thus, constitutionalism in and of 
itself does not make the citizens free or freer in terms of being free 
from domination. A constitution merely constrains some state 
agents in a certain way until other state agents (or sometimes the 
same agents) decide to amend it at their will. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS As A 
NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR FREEDOM 
As noted above, Harel argues that constitutional 
entrenchment of rights is a necessary precondition for freedom 
rather than a mere contingent instrument for protecting freedom 
(pp. 7, 150). Two further comments can be made here. 
Firstly, we should note that this is a slightly different 
argument than the previous one, described above. According to 
Harel's previous argument, constitutional entrenchment of rights 
is valuable regardless of its consequences, i.e., regardless of the 
likelihood that it will better protect rights. According to the 
current argument, constitutional entrenchment of rights is 
valuable because it is a necessary precondition for freedom, i.e., 
because of its desired (potential) consequences. This brings us 
back to the distinction between intrinsic value type 1 (X is always 
good regardless of the consequences) and type 4 (X is a necessary 
yet not sufficient prerequisite for doing good). 
Secondly, it is important to note that Harel's argument (that 
the constitutional entrenchment of rights is a necessary 
precondition for freedom) can only be true if we understand the 
term "freedom" in its "republican," non-intuitive meaning, i.e., 
"freedom" not as not being coerced to do X or prevented from 
doing Y, but rather freedom as not living "at the mercy of the 
ruler." However, most people presumably do not perceive the 
term "freedom" that way, and that alone undermines Harel's 
argument, as Harel aims to accurately describe genuine 
sentiments that "the people" have for their constitution. If we 
perceive freedom as most people (and constitutions) normally do, 
i.e., as not being coerced to do X or prevented from doing Y, then 
the argument that constitutional entrenchment of rights is a 
necessary precondition for freedom can be easily disputed. There 
are examples of democratic states protecting their citizens' rights 
in a satisfactory way without constitutionally entrenched rights 
(e.g., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand-and I am aware of 
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the significant constitutional differences between these three 
states). Having a (proper) Bill of Rights may increase the 
likelihood of protecting freedom more effectively. Having a Bill 
of Rights is not, however, a "necessary precondition for freedom," 
as freedom can be effectively and sufficiently protected by good-
hearted legislatures and administrators and by political 
conventions in the absence of a constitution. 
D. THE TRUE PASSION FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Harel's argument against constitutional instrumentalism is 
that it distorts what is really valuable about constitutionalism, 
namely, the sense that "constitutions are a necessary (rather than 
contingent) feature of a just or legitimate society" (p. 139). Harel 
argues that the instrumental value of the constitution, even if it 
could be established, fails to be attentive to the real reasons 
underlying the passion for constitutionalism. It mlay be the case 
that instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism fail to be 
attentive to the reasons underlying the passion of non-
instrumentalists for constitutionalism. It does not have to be the 
case that instrumentalist arguments fail to reflect the "real" 
reasons for constitutionalism, i.e., reasons that are sincerely held 
by scholars, politicians and "the people." One interesting example 
that is painfully familiar to Harel and myself may help in clarifying 
this claim. 
The example is taken from Israel's unique constitutional 
history. Israel does not have a unified and codified constitution. 
Until 1992, it had nine "Basic Laws," most of which dealt with 
"constitutional subjects," none of which had normative 
superiority over "regular laws." The struggle in Israel to enact a 
constitution has always been identified with liberal politicians and 
academics. The struggle led to the enactment of two new Basic 
Laws in 1992, and to a few subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
that stated that all "Basic Laws" are in fact constitutional legal 
norms which are normatively superior to "regular laws." So, at 
present, Israel does have a set of Basic Laws that, when put 
together, are a "partial constitution." Israel still does not have a 
complete and unified constitution- and especially not a complete 
and unified Bill of Rights. Since the early 1990s, there has been an 
ongoing academic, political and public struggle for ending this 
constitutional anomaly and for enacting a "proper" 
comprehensive and unified constitution. This struggle, which was 
led by liberals and human rights advocates, has slowly faded after 
the campaigners realized that the Israeli Parliament (which has 
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the authority to enact a constitution) as well as the Israeli 
Government are heavily dominated- and will probably be 
dominated for the next few decades- by right-wing nationalist 
parties. In the Israeli parliamentary system, both "regular laws" 
and constitutional legal norms are enacted by Parliament and 
through the ordinary legislative procedure. For the campaigners, 
this means that should a new and comprehensive constitution be 
enacted in Israel, it will probably be a horrendous one. It will 
constitutionally entrench nationalistic, religious, "non-
democratic," and possibly also racist norms. Many of the liberals 
who fought for a "constitution for Israel" now think it is better for 
Israel's fragile democracy not to have a constitution than to have 
an intolerable one that will be interpreted and enforced by the 
new generation of Supreme Court judges, some of whom are too 
fearful of the new generation of anti-democratic politicians or are 
sympathetic to their views. This is constitutional instrumentalism 
at its best. It reflects a genuine approach according to which a 
constitution is only or mostly valuable if it enhances the proper 
protection given to democracy and human rights. It demonstrates 
that the real reasons underlying the passion for constitutionalism 
is protecting human rights and democratic principles and that 
constitutions are not necessarily perceived as "valuable as such." 
If there are good reasons to assume that under certain 
circumstances constitutionalism will fail to protect human rights 
and democratic principles-or might put them in greater 
danger- the passion for constitutionalism is significantly or 
completely diminished- and rightly so. 
3. IS THERE A NON-INSTRUMENTALIST ARGUMENT 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -AND DO WE NEED ONE? 
I will discuss Harel's arguments concerning judicial review in 
the following order: I will first discuss the relation between 
judicial review and the right to a hearing, and will refute the 
argument that the right to a hearing provides non-instrumentalist 
justification for judicial review. I will then discuss Harel's implied 
suggestion for "judicial review without courts." This will be 
followed by criticizing common views (and Hare I 's novel view) on 
the implications of the (alleged?) contrast between judicial review 
and democratic legitimacy. It should be noted that Harel limits 
the discussion to "constitutional" judicial review (i.e., review of 
legislation) and does not aim to apply his arguments to 
"administrative" judicial review (review of decisions of the 
executive). This is important as even if Harel succeeds in making 
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his case for a non-instrumentalist justification for judicial review, 
the argument is only applied to the relatively exceptional cases 
when the court invalidates legislation rather than to the far more 
common cases in which administrative decisions are invalidated. 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW- AND THE RIGHT TO A. HEARING 
According to Harel, judicial review is desirable because it 
protects the right to a hearing. More specifically, he argues that 
"the justification for judicial review is grounded not in the 
superior quality of the decisions resulting from judicial review but 
in the willingness to hear individual grievances, consider their 
soundness, address these grievances in good faith, and act in 
accordance with the outcomes of the deliberation" (p. 2), namely, 
"to reconsider decisions on the basis of the deliberation" (pp. 8, 
134). For Harel "judicial review is (nothing but) a hearing to 
which individuals have a right" (pp. 8, 133, 134). Thus, judicial 
review is not valuable because of the superior quality of decisions 
rendered by judges, the superior ability or willingness of judges to 
protect rights, the special deliberative powers of judges or the 
greater stability and coherence of judicial decision (p. 192). It is 
only or mainly valuable as an application of the right to a hearing. 
Even if we subscribe to the view that judicial review is only 
valuable as an application of the right to a hearing, it does not 
follow that we are in fact making a non-instrumentalist argument 
for judicial review. Hearing individual grievances in good faith is 
not valuable as such. It is merely or mostly a means to an end, and 
the end is making the right decision. Within the context of judicial 
review, hearing grievances is almost pointless if it does not 
improve the quality of the decisions resulting from the review 
process. If hearing grievances is all that matters and if it is valuable 
as such, individuals could present their grievances to any public 
officer even if he or she does not have the authority to amend or 
abolish the statute (or administrative decision) that violated a 
person's rights. Instead of having courts which have the authority 
to review, amend and abolish statutes (or administrative 
decisions), we could have a governmental "department of 
grievances" which merely hears grievances from individuals and 
conveys them to other governmental departrnents or the 
legislature for future reference and general interest. But even 
Harel agrees that the hearing process requires the state agent to 
act in accordance with the outcomes of the deliberation, i.e., "to 
reconsider decisions on the basis of the deliberation" (pp. 8, 134). 
Also, reading Harel's discussion of the right to a hearing within 
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the context of judicial review leads to a conclusion that Harel 
implicitly admits that a hearing itself is a means to an end. What 
would be the point of the hearing process and the right to a 
hearing if it did not allow (and in fact require) the state agents to 
reconsider their decisions in order to make better ones or right 
ones? Being so, the right to a hearing cannot be "valuable as such" 
and cannot form a non-instrumentalist argument for judicial 
review. Harel insists that "judicial review is not a means for 
protecting the right to a hearing; it is, in reality, its institutional 
embodiment" (p. 202). This is slightly confusing, as Harel 
immediately adds that "judicial review is designed to facilitate the 
voicing of grievances by protecting the right to a hearing" (p. 202). 
So perhaps judicial review is a means for protecting the right to a 
hearing after all. Moreover, even if we agree that judicial review 
is not a means for protecting the right to a hearing, but rather its 
institutional embodiment, we cannot escape the conclusion that 
this institutional embodiment is a means to an end after all-a 
mechanism for improving decisionmaking. 
Moreover, if a hearing is all that matters, there is little point 
in allowing standing to those who were already heard before the 
legislature made its decision. If an individual- perhaps also 
through his representatives- has already been heard before the 
decision was made, and if the hearing is all that matters, what 
would be the point of hearing him again after the decision has 
been made? The point of hearing him again is to allow one 
institution (court of law) to apply legal procedure Uudicial 
review) in order to amend or abolish a wrong decision that was 
made by another institution and to get it right. 
The right to hearing is a procedural right. Procedural rights 
may have various rationales. They may secure fairness and 
transparency; they may enable participation in the 
decisionmaking process; they allow the decisionmakers to be 
provided with all the relevant information -and the list goes on. 
But eventually it comes down to enabling the legislature, the 
administrative authority or the courts to make the right decisions. 
These "right" decisions can be right from various perspectives. 
They may promote efficacy, reflect the legislature's intent, 
promote the common good, ensure appropriate protection of 
rights and interests, and so on. Regardless of how we decide what 
a right decision is or may be, procedural rights have little value 
unless they enable decisionmakers to make the right decision. I 
do not deny that the right to a hearing (much like other 
procedural rights) does have some independent value regardless 
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of the merit of the decision likely to result at the end of the 
process. But this independent value is very limited and secondary 
to the main purpose of procedural rights, which is enhancing the 
probability that the resulting decision will be right, reasonable, or 
at least better. 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT COURTS? 
Harel argues that "judicial review is not a practice which 
must be conducted by courts of judges" and that "it is the process 
of adjudication that renders the practice valuable; rather than the 
fact that it is conducted by courts or judges" (pp. 8, 213). 
Harel is probably too hasty here. First, and this is the point 
made above, the process of adjudication, which, as Harel argues, 
is equated with a process of hearing, is not valuable as such. It is 
valuable mainly as a means to an end. The end is making the right 
decision. The means is a process of hearing/adjudication. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Harel is too quick to dismiss the 
necessity of courts and judges. For a process of adjudication or 
hearing to be conducted appropriately and in good faith- and as 
a process of "review"-an independent third party is required. 
This third party (the adjudicator or arbitrator) has to be 
personally and institutionally independent of both the state's 
organs (especially those who made the original decision) and the 
litigant-individual. For the adjudication process and its results to 
be fair, consistent and equal they have to rely on the adjudicator's 
best and honest understanding of the law rather than on his 
personal perception of justice. In other words, the adjudication 
process has to be conducted by a court of law-or by any other 
institution that goes by whatever name that will be institutionally 
identical to what we know as "courts of law." Independent, bias-
free and law-obeying institutions, which also have the authority to 
overrule decisions of the state's organs, are a necessary 
precondition for a proper process of hearing to take place. Harel 
therefore is probably wrong to argue that "it is the process of 
adjudication that renders the practice valuable; rather than the 
fact that it is conducted by courts or judges" (p. 8), as the latter is 
a necessary precondition of the former. Harellater admits that "to 
the extent that other institutions can conduct a hearing, it is only 
because they operate in a judicial manner and thereby 
functionally become courts" (pp. 212, 214). It is not clear, 
however, why Harel thinks that "in principle, the right to a 
hearing can be protected by any institution, including perhaps the 
legislature" (p. 214). Adjudication, "constitutional" hearing, 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 655 
judges and courts (properly understood) are intertwined as one 
assumes the existence of the others. This means that judicial 
review is a practice that must be conducted by courts and judges 
after all. 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
Harel accurately presents the current state of affairs in the 
common political and constitutional theory discourse (p. 135): 
advocates of constitutionalism and rights-based judicial review 
rely only on instrumentalist arguments according to which 
constitutionalism and judicial review are justified because (or as 
long as) they bring about better protection of human rights. A 
similar instrumentalist argument would be that constitutionalism 
and especially judicial review are justified because they are likely 
to bring about better protection of human rights. Critics of 
constitutionalism and rights-based judicial review use both 
instrumentalist arguments (by stressing the superior quality of 
legislative decisions) and non-instrumentalist arguments (by 
describing constitutionalism and judicial review as "anti-
democratic" and thus illegitimate). Harel concludes that by 
ignoring non-instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and 
judicial review, their advocates "fight with one hand tied behind 
their back" (p. 135). Harel's mission is therefore to add non-
instrumentalist arguments to the arsenal of arguments favoring 
constitutionalism and by that to "level the field in constitutional 
theory" (p. 135). 
The non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based argument against 
constitutionalism and judicial review could have been troubling 
for advocates of constitutionalism (who do not use non-
instrumentalist arguments) if it were a convincing or even a valid 
one. The non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based argument against 
constitutionalism is, however, an extremely weak, unconvincing 
argument. As will be explained shortly, it relies on myths and 
imaginary facts. Thus there is no unlevelled field in constitutional 
theory that needs to be levelled. The need to add non-
instrumentalist arguments to the arsenal of arguments favoring 
constitutionalism would have been an urgent and essential need 
only if advocates of constitutionalism in fact thought that there 
are powerful non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based arguments 
against constitutionalism, arguments that cannot be refuted 
easily. This is, however, not the case. As this is a book review 
rather than a book, I am not able to establish this argument in full. 
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I will therefore limit the following discussion to a list of pressure 
points. 
The core of the non-instrumentalist, legitimacy-based 
argument against constitutionalism and judicial review is that they 
are "anti-democratic." This argument focuses on the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, which is one of the tnost common 
problems in constitutional theory. According to the counter-
majoritarian argument, there is a problem with the legitimacy of 
the institution of judicial review and with constitutional 
entrenchment of rights. It is "anti-democratic" when unelected 
judges use the power of judicial review to nullify the actions of 
elected legislators, while interpreting a constitution that can 
hardly be amended. The court, so it is argued, acts contrary to the 
majority will as expressed by representative institutions. There 
are numerous ways to answer this counter-majoritarian argument. 
I will present, very briefly, only some of them, and will conclude 
by suggesting my own response. 
Firstly, one can hold the "discrete and insular minorities" 
doctrine, according to which there are groups that are excluded 
from the give-and-take of democratic politics. These groups are 
almost always the losers in the democratic process and should be 
protected from certain decisions of the majority. Therefore, 
judicial review is legitimate only when it serves to protect the 
rights of "discrete and insular minorities" against oppressive 
actions by democratic majorities. John Hart Ely's "procedural 
rights theory" falls neatly within this instrumentalist argument for 
judicial review.' This approach, however, offers too narrow a 
protection of human rights. For that reason (and for other reasons 
that will not be elaborated here), it does not provide a satisfactory 
reply to the anti-majoritarian argument. 
Secondly, one can argue, much like Bruce Ackerman, that 
judicial review is actually a democratic institution that checks the 
anti-democratic actions of elected officials.4 Ackerman 
distinguishes between "ordinary politics" and "constitutional 
politics." He then adds that for various reasons, "the people" do 
not really get involved in ordinary politics. Therefore, ordinary 
politics are not really very democratic. Things are quite different 
regarding "constitutional politics." Here, "the people" normally 
become more engaged in the relevant issues and by expressing its 
3. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 157 (19XO). 
4. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS lJ--13 (1991 ). 
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wishes through the constitutional level, the majority commands 
its representatives to act in accordance with its clear wishes. The 
courts are merely enforcing the majority will by subordinating 
"ordinary politics" to "constitutional politics." The part of 
Ackerman's theory that stresses the difficulty with "ordinary 
politics" has its appeal. I suspect that Ackerman's "constitutional 
moments" answer does not solve the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty in a satisfactory way, yet I will not discuss this point here. 
Thirdly, one can admit that judicial review is anti-democratic 
but add that there are some values (liberty, equality, some moral 
imperatives and the like) that trump democratic legitimacy. 
Therefore, judicial review is indeed anti-democratic but at the 
same time justified when it protects these values (p. 141 ). This 
approach, which has a certain appeal, is explicitly refuted by 
Harel. 
Fourthly, and this is the argument suggested by Harel, it can 
be argued that some decisions about human rights are not the type 
of decisions that should be made by the public or by the majority 
(through its representatives) to begin with. Thus, there is no 
"democratic loss" that needs to be justified, as some decisions 
about human rights are by their nature beyond the jurisdiction of 
"the people". This is a very interesting argument that may offer a 
sound response to the anti-majoritarian argument. I am afraid, 
however, that Harel does not fully explain and does not set clear 
criteria as to why exactly some decisions are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the democratic legislature-or indeed "the 
people." 
Harel gives the example of his owing $100 to John. Harel 
argues that should he refuse to pay his debt, the dispute should 
not be decided by democratic deliberation. Moreover, Harel 
argues that in this case we should not strike a balance between 
John's right to the money (or his claim that such a right exists) and 
the procedural rights of citizens to political participation -as in 
this case there is no right to political participation to begin with 
(at least not on fairness or neutrality grounds). This is so because 
John's claim, Harel argues, "hinges only on the substantive merit 
of his claim" (p. 142) rather than on a vote or a referendum or any 
other procedure. In other words, John's right to the $100 "is not 
conditional on anybody's good will or preference or judgment" 
(p. 142). But what makes the courts-or perhaps other institutions 
that do not reflect the majority will- better at adjudicating such a 
dispute? Harel's answer is that considerations of neutrality and 
fairness are irrelevant here (or merely insufficient). All that 
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matters is that the institution that adjudicates such cases will be 
an embodiment of reason- and that the dispute will be decided 
by using reason (p. 143). This innovative approach gives rise to a 
few troubling questions. First, it is not quite clear what Harel 
means by "reason"- what would be the alternatives for acting 
upon reason (within the political-legal context)? Secondly, it is 
not clear whether there is a difference between acting upon 
reason and applying the law. Put differently, it is not clear whether 
decisions about rights should be made in accordance with 
"reason" or in accordance with the law. Thirdly, J-Iarel does not 
explicitly say which institution is more likely to act upon reason-
and how are we to ensure that it would do so. Fourthly, and 
despite the third point above, it is implied that disputes about 
rights should be decided by courts and not by democratic 
deliberation. If this is so, Harel is in fact making what appears to 
be an instrumentalist argument, which goes as follows: the only 
way to make the right decision in cases involving disputes about 
rights is to use "reason"; courts are more likely to use reason when 
deciding such cases; therefore, courts are more likelly to get it right 
when disputes about rights are decided; thus, courts should 
adjudicate such cases. This is in fact an instrumentalist argument 
for rights-based judicial review. Moreover, if courts are the 
appropriate forum for deciding disputes about rights because they 
are superior in their deliberative powers (as they are more 
qualified and more likely to act upon reason), it may raise dignity-
based concerns as this approach is based on a distrust of people's 
normative judgments. Hare] himself refers to these concerns as a 
drawback of instrumentalist arguments for judicial review. He 
argues that these concerns result only from instrumentalist 
arguments for judicial review (or constitutionalisrnt). My worry is 
that these concerns result from Harel's approach as well, probably 
because it is an instrumentalist approach after all. 5 
Thus far I have discussed three common replies to the 
"counter-majoritarian" argument against constitutionalism and 
judicial review- and a fourth and innovative one which was 
suggested by Harel. In the following I wish to offer a fifth reply 
which is absent from the current political and constitutional 
theory discourse and was not mentioned in Harel's book either. 
5. I suspect that the concerns ahout distrusting people's normative judgments 
should he ignored, as most people arc ignorant and lack sufficient knowledge and ability 
to make proper normative judgments, hut since Harcl takes these concerns seriously I am 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that he is right in doing so. 
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My proposed response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
is that it should be admitted that judicial review is, by and large, 
anti-democratic, in the sense that judges do not necessarily act 
according to the majority will. However, and for numerous 
reasons, we should also admit that the legislature and "democratic 
deliberation" also do not and often cannot reflect the majority 
will, either accurately, remotely or at all. The counter-
majoritarian argument applies both to the judiciary and to the 
legislature- and to a similar extent. Therefore, various 
instrumentalist arguments can be brought against judicial review 
and in favor of legislative supremacy. The counter-majoritarian 
argument, however, as a legitimacy-based argument (which may 
be a non-instrumentalist argument) cannot really be an argument 
against judicial review and for legislative supremacy, since this is 
an argument against both judicial review and legislative 
supremacy (or legitimacy). 
Jeremy Waldron, a prominent champion of anti-
constitutionalism and anti-judicial review, asserts that opting for 
judicial review results in a loss for democracy. 6 It would seem that 
the idea at the basis of this claim is that being unable to participate 
in a decision about rights undermines the political equality that is 
fundamental to democracy. Thus, the choice, as Waldron presents 
it, is between letting the elected representatives of the people who 
occupy the legislature make the final decisions on rights and 
letting the unelected "judicial aristocracy" make the ultimate 
decisions. We are encouraged to regard the choice in favor of the 
legislature as resulting in no loss of government by the people, and 
the choice in favor of judicial review as occasioning a significant 
loss. 
However, there is a significant loss for self-government in the 
choice of a representative democracy itself. Martin Loughlin 
rightly writes that a representative democracy 
establishes a form of government far removed from the notion 
of democracy as collective self-government .... Governments 
of a modern representative democratic character do not in any 
strict sense express the popular will. Although they elect 
representatives, the people do not govern, even in the indirect 
sense of choosing individuals who will assemble to put their will 
into action. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that the 
6. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10-17,211-312 (1999). See 
generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
1346 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 
OxrORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1X (1993). 
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people merely select from amongst the competitors those who 
will take the political decisions. 7 
When reading Waldron's work in this area, one is left with 
the sense that whenever disagreements about rights arise we are 
choosing between a system where a particular citizen goes out and 
casts a vote in favor of or against a particular condusion and a 
system in which a group of judges makes the decision for him. 
What Loughlin's point makes us realize it that even when the 
legislature is deciding, someone else is deciding for that particular 
citizen. The notion that democracy is in fact a myth is not new. It 
was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who said that "If we take the term in 
the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there 
never will be. ,x He also added that "The people of England 
regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only 
during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are 
elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. "'1 Even though 
Rousseau wrote this at a certain time in a certain place, the core 
of his arguments (which will not be elaborated here) is universally 
valid. 
Thus, to present the argument as though judicial review is the 
only choice that results in a loss of self-government is incorrect. 
This point needs further elaboration, yet I will not try to explain 
in full why democracy does not exist and cannot exist. In the 
following I will describe in a nutshell three well-known reasons 
(out of 15 I have identified to date- and my research is not over 
yet) why modern representative democracy results in a loss of 
democracy, in the sense that it fails, at times significantly, to 
reflect the idea of collective self-government. The reasons are 
first, a lack of real choice; second, the need to form a political 
coalition; and third, the complete distortion of the majority will 
caused by non-proportional voting systems. 
As to a lack of real choice: all too often citizens do not have 
a real choice when they elect their representatives. This is the case 
when the voter can only choose between a few political parties or 
candidates. This is the case, for example, in the U.S.A. (where 
normally only two political parties are represented in the federal 
7. Martin Loughlin, Rights, Democracy, and l~aw, in SCEIPTICAL ESSAYS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 41,51 (Tom Camphcll, K.D. Ewing & Adam Tomkins cds., 2001). 
X. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL RIGHT III, at ch.4 ( 1762), available at https://chooks.adclaidc.cdu.au/r/ 
rousscau/j can_j acq ucs/rXMs/hook3. h tm l#scction27. 
9. !d. at ch.15. 
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legislature), the U.K. (normally three to five parties) and Canada 
(normally four parties). 
Generally speaking, we have a real choice which enables us 
to express and realize our preferences when we have an adequate 
number of valuable options. When we only have a handful of 
parties or candidates to choose from, and especially when some 
or most of them are not perceived by us as "valuable options," we 
normally do not have a real choice, and therefore are not able to 
express our true will by choosing one of them. In the lJ .S.A., to 
take one clear example, there are normally only two political 
parties and two candidates for President. In this case, when a 
voter's views do not match in a satisfactory way the political 
agenda of either of these parties, this voter has little or almost no 
real political choice. How should a voter vote when he supports 
compulsory health insurance but opposes same-sex marriage? 
How should a voter vote when she supports hard-core capitalism 
and the idea of small government but also supports abortion on 
demand? 
This lack of choice makes it harder to argue that the elected 
body represents in any meaningful way the majority will. The 
problem, however, is that having a great number of political 
parties does not necessarily increase self-government and 
accordingly does not decrease the democratic loss. This leads us 
to the second reason for why democracy cannot exist. 
As to proportional voting systems and the necessity to form 
a political coalition: in political systems where parliament consists 
of a large number of political parties, a coalition of a few parties 
may be required in order to form a stable government. This is the 
case, for example, in France, Italy, and especially in Israel, where 
we can find around 10 political parties represented in parliament 
and 4-6 political parties forming a coalition government. Alas, 
those who vote for a certain political party cannot always predict 
who its associates in a future coalition would be, and consequently 
cannot always predict which political principles will guide this 
coalition. Such a political system can offer more choice at the time 
of the election. But once the election is over and decisions are 
made concerning the compromises that should be made in order 
to form a coalition of political parties, the will of the majority is 
set aside, at least to a certain extent. 
Moreover, in a political regime of a coalition of parties, a 
counter-majoritarian problem within the legislature is almost 
inevitable. This is so because in a system of political coalition, 
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small political parties that are part of the leading coalition of 
parties enjoy great political influence, which is highly 
disproportionate to the number of votes they received. In these 
cases, the majority will (if there is any) is not just being ignored, 
at least in part, but is being replaced by the will of several 
minorities, which, at times, runs against the clear interests of the 
majority itself. 
As to non-proportional voting systems and the complete 
distortion of the majority will: non-proportional voting systems, 
such as majoritarian voting systems, winner-takes-all voting 
systems (in cases when there are several constituencies) and 
mixed voting systems normally completely fail to reflect the 
majority will. 
In the U.K., for example, in almost all cases in the twentieth 
century in which one political party won more than 50o/o of seats 
in parliament, this party did not receive more than 50°/o of the 
people's votes. In other words, a single political party normally 
gains almost ultimate control on the executive and legislative 
branches, while being opposed by the majority of voters. In Italy, 
after the 2008 election, Berlusconi's coalition won 47°/o of the 
people's votes but 54o/o of seats in the legislature. In France, after 
the 2007 election, Nicolas Sarkozy's party won 39o/o of the 
people's votes but 54°/o of seats in parliament. In Canada, in the 
2011 election, the conservative party won 40o/o of the people's 
votes but 54 o/o of seats in Parliament. In the U.S.A., in the 2000 
elections, Al Gore won more than 51 million votes but lost the 
presidency to George Bush who won less than 50.5 million votes 
(with Ralph Nader winning almost 3 million votes--most of which 
would have been given to Gore had Nader not run for the 
presidency). These are not rare examples but representative ones. 
More generally, in non-proportional voting systems, there is 
normally no correlation between the percentage of votes a 
political party gets and the number of seats in parliament to which 
the same party is entitled- and smaller parties are systematically 
adversely affected. In the U.K., to take only one illustrative 
example, the Liberal Democrat party has been consistently 
under-represented in Parliament in a way that completely 
diminishes the "democratic" nature of the election .. In 1974 and in 
1992, for example, the Liberal Democrat party won 18°/o of the 
votes but less than 2o/o of seats in Parliament. In 2010 they won 
23°/o of the votes but less than 9o/o of seats in Parliament. 
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In the 2015 election, the gap between U.K.'s self-perception 
as a democracy and the facts was truly astonishing. To take a few 
examples: the Labour Party increased its share of the votes by 
1.5°/o but lost 26 seats in Parliament; the SNP got 4.7o/o of votes 
and 56 seats. The Liberal-Democrats got 7.9°/o of votes but only 8 
seats; and UKIP got 12.6o/o of the votes but only 1 seat. It is quite 
obvious that in majoritarian, anti-democratic voting systems, 
gaining popular support is one thing and gaining seats in the 
legislature is another thing. More generally, it is not clear how 
political systems that employ a non-proportional voting system 
can seriously discuss the majority will as a justification for 
rejecting constitutionalism or judicial review on both legislative 
and administrative decisions. 
These are just a few reasons- and there are many more-
why democracy does not exist and cannot exist. In light of the 
above incomplete, simplistic, yet clear evidence of how the 
majority will is being significantly and institutionally distorted in 
all "democracies," the academic discourse about "democratic 
legitimacy," the majority will, and the democratic supremacy of 
Parliament is completely meaningless, as it is based on myths and 
fabricated assumptions. 
One quick warning is required here: we should be careful not 
to equate free elections and public legitimacy (which may result 
from ignorance or brainwashing) with democracy. "The people" 
may be happy with rolling a dice or flipping a coin as a voting or 
decisionmaking system. These systems may enjoy public 
legitimacy- but they will not be democratic in any meaningful 
sense-in the same way that one's autonomous decision to 
completely waive one's autonomy and to unquestionably obey an 
authority does not mean that that person is now autonomous. For 
a voting system to be democratic, it is not sufficient that it enjoys 
public legitimacy. For a voting system to be democratic, its results 
should reflect as accurately as possible the genuine preferences of 
voters. 
Since no representative democracy- or any other type of 
democracy-can truly or even remotely reflect the majority will, 
the counter-majoritarian argument or the argument about 
"democratic deliberation" cannot be used against 
constitutionalism and judicial review. And since non-
instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and judicial 
review have very limited power, then in the battlefield of 
arguments for and against constitutionalism and judicial review it 
is instrumentalist arguments who decide who wins. Harel is right 
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to argue that instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and 
judicial review have their flaws, but it does not follow that there 
are better, non-instrumentalist arguments that can overcome 
these flaws. It is possible that, for better or for worse, 
instrumentalist arguments are all we have for (and against) 
judicial review. 
CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR MOI)EST 
CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTALISM 
Harel's purpose in his book is not to replace all 
instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalisrrt and judicial 
review with non-instrumentalist arguments. Harel does suggest, 
however, that some instrumentalist arguments for 
constitutionalism and judicial review are not as strong as they 
appear to be, and that sometimes non-instrumentalist arguments 
complement instrumentalist ones, are superior to them, or even 
are the only ones that can truly explain the nature and importance 
of constitutionalism and judicial review. The argument that 
constitutionalism and judicial review are not merely means for 
protecting rights and promoting justice but are also valuable as 
such-can be quite powerful. However, in some parts of the book 
it seems that Harel's dismissal of instrumentalist arguments is too 
quick and too broad, and, accordingly, the weight that he accords 
to non-instrumentalist arguments is probably too excessive, as 
they are not always free of difficulties. 
To take one example, in his attack on constitutional 
instrumentalism Harel argues that it rests on factual speculations 
that cannot be substantiated and that it suffers frorrt inauthenticity 
or insincerity (pp. 4, 135). The argument about constitutional 
instrumentalism resting on factual speculations can be answered 
in the following way. It can be argued that constitutional 
instrumentalism does not necessarily mean that, for example, 
constitutionalism and judicial review are desirable because they 
always bring about good or better results in terms of protecting 
rights and public goods. Constitutional instrmnentalism may 
mean that constitutionalism and judicial review are desirable as 
long as they bring about better results and to the extent that they 
do that. This way we avoid factual speculations. We also avoid the 
difficulty of making broad generalizations while ignoring social, 
political and legal circumstances that are time- and place-
sensitive. Presumably we can be a bit bolder, and argue that 
constitutionalism and judicial review are desirable because they 
increase the likelihood that human rights and public goods will be 
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better protected, simply because they put limits on the power of 
the executive and the legislature, and because usually power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Thus the 
(intrinsic?) value of constitutionalism and judicial review lies 
within the good old doctrine of the separation of powers in its 
modern form of "checks and balances." Constitutions and judicial 
review put limits on the power of the legislature and the executive. 
In some cases these limits may prevent the legislature and the 
executive from doing the right thing, but in the long run and on 
the whole it is better for citizens to live in a state in which the most 
dangerous branches (the legislature and the executive) are being 
restrained by constitutionalism and judicial review. This is so 
because usually power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely, and because constitutionalism and rights-based 
judicial review do not accord absolute power to the courts, 
whereas the lack of a binding constitution and judicial review 
results in nearly absolute legislative and executive power. We do 
not really need social science research to successfully substantiate 
this statement. Common sense as well as recent and not-so-recent 
history will do. 
As to the problem of inauthenticity or insincerity, I am afraid 
that Harel's non-instrumentalist arguments are also not free from 
this difficulty. Harel's argument that constitutions and judicial 
review are valuable as such, relies in part on factual speculations. 
Harel argues that his purpose is to "identify justifications which 
meet the test of sincerity, namely that address the genuine 
sentiments underlying the popular support of political institutions 
and procedures, rather than to rationalize these institutions and 
procedures in terms that are alien to those who establish the 
institutions and sustain them" (pp. 4-5). Harel then assumes that 
the value of constitutions as the public acknowledgment of the 
duty to protect rights and the value of judicial review as the 
institutional embodiment of the right to a hearing accurately 
capture popular sensibilities. 
There are some huge factual assumptions here that call into 
question the authenticity of Harel's approach. Harel assumes that 
both current popular support of political institutions and 
procedures-and the state of mind of those who established and 
sustain these institutions and procedures-rely, in whole or in 
part, on non-instrumentalist arguments. There is no evidence to 
support these assumptions. These assumptions may or may not be 
reasonable, but they are assumptions and speculations 
nevertheless. Harel may offer a compelling way to understand the 
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true nature or rationale of some political institutions and 
procedures, regardless of whether this way is shared by others. 
But as compelling as this way may be, it does not follow that it is 
shared by the public or by state officials. 
In conclusion, the importance of Harel's book is twofold. 
First, it offers important, exciting, and innovative non-
instrumentalist arguments for constitutionalism and judicial 
review, and it does so in a clear, engaging and captivating way. 
Second, while I have doubts as to whether Harel's non-
instrumentalist arguments outweigh sorne relevant 
instrumentalist arguments, they do give rise to doubts with regard 
to the soundness of some common relevant instrumentalist 
arguments. These doubts call for modesty, coherence, and 
sincerity when instrumentalist approaches are applied to support 
constitutional procedures and institutions. Too many 
instrumentalist arguments in the common discourse about 
constitutionalism and judicial review attempt to establish that 
constitutions and judicial review always result in better protection 
of rights, public goods or democratic principles, and that is what 
makes them valuable. A more modest and defensible line of 
argument would be that constitutionalism and judicial review are 
valuable because they are likely to better protect rights, public 
goods or democratic principles, and to an extent they actually do 
so. Much like the law, the rule of law, autonomy, and life itself, 
constitutions and judicial review are means to an end (doing good 
or promoting justice), and are only or mainly valuable to the 
extent that they achieve that end. Their success depends on 
changeable circumstances and is time- and place-sensitive. This 
modest instrumentalism is perhaps not very exciting, but is 
probably the best way to understand the value of 
constitutionalism- and its limits. 
